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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This discussion aims to appreciate Santayana's view of the
relation of man's sense of beauty to his other senses and to
investigate the nature of beauty and art in Santayana. Being
neither an interactionlst nor a parallelist, Santayana holds
that logically there are no connecting links. But although his
epistemology asserts the validity of critical realism, his words
contain all the wonder of a monk of the Dark Ages that things
should be what they are. Sceptical but scolastic, Santayana
is the last of the Occasionalists . And even though associational
doctrines may be superseded, Santayana has assured his own
immortality among the eternal essences, where his ideas will
always be susceptible of enjoyment and aesthetic contemplation
As the following pages propose to set forth, there is a
sharp break in nature as Santayana sees it. The subject of
Chapter II will be the two disparate worlds of matter and
essence. In spite of the fact that aesthetics, ethics, and
logic, since they are all forms of thought and philosophy, are
inseparable in Santayana, there are nevertheless two ways of
meeting beauty in his world, that is, by practicing It or by
intuiting it. This chapter discusses the constant dualism
running through Santayana's philosophy. His scholastic bent is
11
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seen to incline him toward a belief in the noumenal while his
Grecian objectivity firmly postulates the substantial world of
matter. Thus a curious theory of aesthetics arises in Santayana.
All of man's experience combines the eternal and the moving,
the static and the dynamic. Beauty itself is the objectification
of one of man's impermanent sensations. Santayana distinguishes
sharply between beauty and happiness. His associational theory
describes beauty as an individual phenomenon dependent on the
character of unique experiences.
The following chapter, Chapter III, will deal with the
transition from beauty to art. A survey of what Santayana
regards as the origin of art in material existence and of
beauty from the meaningful and valuable given will be considered
The part morality plays in art will be discussed, and the
nature of the specific arts considered.
Santayana divides aesthetics according as it is didactic,
historical, or psychological. ^ The first type comprises the
criticism of art, the second deals with the various manifes-
tations of the creative impulse, while the third consists in
the attempt to understand the experience of beauty intrinsically
as well as in its relation to other elements of experience.
Santayana follows this third method. He does not aim to organize
and co-ordinate the aesthetic judgment but simply to understand
1 SB, 5. (The abbreviations which are used throughout are
in the bibliography at the end of the thesis.)

3the Gestalt already Inherent In the perception of beauty.^ The
Platonic aesthetic Is such a Gestalt.
Those Intuitions which we call Platonic are seldom
scientific, they seldom explain the phenomena or hit upon
the actual law of things, but they are often the highest
expression of that activity which they fail to make
comprehensible.
3
In spite of their beauty, such expressions are not explicative
of the aesthetic impulse which prompted them. And although "to
feel beauty is a better thing than to understand how we come to
feel it,"4 the latter task is the philosopher's prerogative.
Santayana is concerned with the origin of ideals, their
comparison with facts, the essential element of beauty, and our
sensitiveness to it.5 In order to understand the conclusions
Santayana reaches a knowledge of his whole system is needed,
for the premisses of his aesthetic are elaborated in his
metaphysic and epistemology.
Therefore this discussion will deal with the bases of
Santayana' s aesthetic, with his definition of beauty, and
finally with his conception of the origin of art. The Conclusion
will summarize the chief points of the discussion, maintaining
an approach from within the system rather than from without.
The source material is for the most part primary, although
occasionally a reviewer or critic may have suggested some
modification in the interpretation of the subject.
2 Ibid., 7. 4 ibid., 11.
3 Ibid., 8. 5 ibid., 13.

II
Since Santayana uses many terms distinctively, a knowledge
of the most important is prerequisite to an understanding of
his aesthetic. The following chart illustrates the manner in
which Santayana divides man's experience into two categories.
BEING IN EXISTENCE
Substance
Self
Instinct
Knowledge
* Events and Things
^ Expression
The first realm is that of Being, the static world of the given,
while the realm of Existence is pure spaco~temporality. Man
finds the given through the web of space and time, and thus his
first discovery is the dual quality of his life, composed of
Essence and Matter.
An essence is for Santayana what an Idea was for Plato or
a formal cause for Aristotle. An essence is "ante rem."
Essences are without existing. They are changeless, absolute,
and eternal. One essence can never become another. Their
immutability is all that is.
The monotony of the eternal essences is fortunately relieved
by matter, which corresponds to Aristotle's material cause.
Nothing can be known about matter except its existence, and all
-€
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5that can be known about this is that it is material. Yet matter
brings essences to life. Materialized, they are the substance
of man's experience. This substance, the synthesis of essence
and matter, is the habitat of man's self, which reflects its
surroundings and comes to have two natures - spirit and psyche.
Spirit is man's capacity to deal with essences, while his
psyche or physical self effects material equilibrium in
existence.
Whether a function creates an organ or vice versa is a
matter for biological and psychological dispute, but man's
functions in either case parallel his potentialities. Intuition
is the act by which spirit comes in contact with essence, and
animal faith together with the "shock" of events is the psyche's
method of progressing in existence. These functions, whether
they precede or modify the self, compose the primary instinct
of man or rather his primary instincts, for the synthesis of
intuition and animal faith at once breaks up into thought and
conduct.
Thought deals with the intuited essences; conduct, with
the existence which is believed in by animal faith. Knowledge
is less a synthesis of thought and conduct than their proper
admixture. For knowledge tries to harmonize the disparate, to
understand the given as it comes into the flux of existing
space and time.
The form of an event is its trope. A trope is "the essence

6of any event. "6 A further discussion of this abstraction of
essence from situations is unnecessary to Santayana's aesthetic,
which hinges more closely on events and things. These are
eddies defined in the flux by tropes. Santayana's thing suggests
McTaggart's "vanishing somewhat" and Aristotle* s "substance."
In their turn things reflect a dualism of form and material.
And because of the variety of man's experience, he associates
things and events, and expression arises. Expression is
meaning acquired by association become intrinsic.
Thus Santayana's own words have a dual character. They
"signify" ideas or essences while they "demonstrate" facts. A
philosopher is ultimately reduced to a universe deduced from
axiomatic laws and didactic postulates or to a manner of proof
similar to primitive gesticulations. Santayana chooses both.
He postulates Being and points to Existence, and the rest
follows ipso facto.
6 SAP, 112.

CHAPTER II
THE BASES OP SANTAYAN
A
1 S AESTHETIC
The basic postulate of a man's ideas is doubtless the man
himself. Since the famous classification of William James
which divided beliefs according to their emotional tenderness
or vigor an increasing emphasis has been placed on the influence'
of a man's temperament on his philosophy. In the case of
Santayana his philosophy may be said to be the direct expression
of his temperament.
A brillant scholar with nothing of the pedant about him, a
poet who enjoyed watching football practice at Harvard, a
native of Spain who spent his youth in the tradition of Boston,
who learned English when he was nine and later wrote a sonnet
sequence in this language which is already a classic, the
linguistic ability of Santayana is the natural talent of a
Latin mind to translate its emotions into words. Thought itself
is for Santayana a form of emotion. Every language Is a differ-
ent phenomenon. The very emotional significance of the formulae
of mathematical physics give them their peculiar connotation,
untranslatable as the simple melody of Greek or the majesty of
a Latin whose every word "is noble and wears the toga."l
Contemporary grammar cannot duplicate the formal purity of
1 SB, 172.

8ancient tongues, but Santayana finds in English the medium for
"suggestion" and "refinement of sentiment*" 2
Thus the crudity of an inflexion which can only hint at
what it means to say becomes the strength of an expression
which is conscious. Such a tongue admirably suits the tempera-
ment of Santayana for the system of his philosophy is a
structure merely by implication. The works of Santayana seek
to establish no final postulates nor basic conditions. They are
the intermittent exclamations of a man who finds much beauty in
the world. Yet underlying the delicate nuances of his experience;
several assumptions repeat themselves again and again. A
scholastic dualism, perhaps a vestige of his ancestry, runs
continuously through his musing. To be is always something more
for Santayana than to exist - and something less.
Santayana admits that he is "an ignorant man and almost a
poet" although he denies being "a poet in the magic sense of
the word." 3 He pretends only to unfold the Greek view of things.
For, he says, the Greeks have made all the discoveries. "The
age of controversy is past; that of interpretation has
succeeded."4 Thus a classic detachment pervades the worlds of
fact and idea in Santayana or, as he would say, the realms of
matter and essence*
2 Ibid., 174.
3 SE, 6-7.
4 RCS, 32.

9The structure of nature he compares to that of a Gothic
cathedral, "a harmony woven out of accidents*., and all the
more profound and fertile because no mind could ever have
designed it."5 The realms of being and existence are the
differentia of experience, which reflects man's dual nature of
spirit and psyche. The spirit's function is intuition or the
apprehension of essences, those infinite, absolute and eternal
goods, 6 while the function of the psyche is animal faith or
the impetus which effects action by force of belief in man's
capacity to deal with matter.
Essences are figments of thought and imagination, the
immutable "forms of everything and anything." 7 They are no
Logos but "rather a chaos than a cosmos."8 Disconnected from
space and time, they have neither implications nor consequences.
They simply are.
But for man to be satisfied with the ptire "given" of the
critical realists, the mere inventory of the universe, is for
him to lose the beauty and value of events » Essences are goods,
yet their logical perfection would have no value without the
opportunity which existence affords in its chronologically
perservering substance. Preference is as absurd in the realm
of being as discrimination is wise in the realm of existence
5 COUS, 231.
6 SB, 59.
7 SAP, 129.
8 RE, 82.
11
1
# j ' .' - j ' t iTJ o .l, .LP©x2 O ^ p 7 Ji OJSC *j
*
10
r-'
whose dimensiona constrain men "to appropriate such things as
serve their use, perfection, or fancy, and to leave all else
alone.
"
9 As Democritus remarks to the stranger in Limbo, "I
daresay there is a poet in every nut and in every berry. But the
soul of animals must be watchful; they cannot live on mere hope,
fortitude and endurance. "10
To the spirit "the length of things is vanity and only their
height is joy; "H To the psyche, which is essentially "a way of
living "12 and "a material system stretching over both time and
space, "13 "compromise seems the path of profit and justice. "I4
If the human animal were only spirit, art would be superfluous
because intuition supplies its own object. And by seeing all
things in their essential beauty the spirit would be unaware of
beauty. Comparisons, however, are not odious to the psyche.
Indeed, it lives by associations and anticipations. Moving
through space and time it can appreciate the changing sequence
of a statue's curves or listen to a symphony. The spirit has
heard the whole movement at the first chord.
Thus man's spirit is in one sense "a rank outsider. "I5 It
"has slipped in, as Aristotle says, from beyond the gates. "-^
It recognises the beauty with which the psyche is acquainted.
9 SE, 50.
10 DL, 77.
11 SE, 116.
12 Ibid., 222.
13
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Loc. cit.
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Yet without intuition to apprehend the plurality of the
universe, man might never experience more than the dark monism
of matter. The spirit knows while the psyche believes. And the
world is one of belief and action as well as idea. "In order to
exist it must enact itself ignorantly and successively, and
carry down all ideas of it in its own current ."l?
Such a world is, of course, arbitrary. 18 But it is based on
an instinctive hazard, and instincts constitute Santayana's
final criterion. Animals live by the noble strength with which
the unsuspecting bull continues to follow the lure. 1-9
There is a steady human nature within us, which our
moods and passions may wrong but cannot annul. There is
no categorical imperative but only the operation of
instincts and interests more or less subject to discipline
and mutual adjustment. Our whole life is a compromise, an
incipient loose harmony between the passions of the soul
and the forces of nature, forces which likewise generate
and protect the souls of other creatures, endowing them
with powers of expression and self-assertion comparable
with our own, and with aims no less sweet and worthy in
their own eyes; so that the quick and honest mind cannot
but practice courtesy in the universe, exercising its
will without vehemence or forced assurance, judging with
serenity, and in everything discarding the word absolute
as the most false and the most odious of words .20
The only reason for one essence to appear in matter rather
than another is the Occasionalist ' s criterion of chance.
Santayana never doubts that circumstances are fortuitous. 21 In
17 SAP, 48.
18 Ibid., 49.
19 EGP, 148.
20 Loc. cit.
21 RA, 16.

the unfolding flux ideas and figments occasion spontaneous
tic; it issues in life and breeds all sorts of warm passions
and idle beauties . "22
Had the flux of Heraclitus been disturbed merely by
Democritean atoms or by purely rational consciousnesses, its
capacity for beauty would have gone unheeded. 23 The intellect
deals with fact; the aesthetic aid moral activities deal with
value. 24 The two latter must be sharply distinguished, since
morality constitutes the destruction of impediments which might
have prevented the enjoyment of "our holiday life, when we are
redeemed for the moment from the shadow of evil and the slavery
to fear, and are following the bent of our nature where it
chooses to lead us ."25
So it is unmeaning to speak of art as useless. Utility may
justify morality, but an aesthetic judgment justifies itself.
The pure moralist is a slave, 26 for he is conditioned by all
the evil which it befalls him to avoid. The philosopher of
beauty is the supremely free man. And in this way moral value
turns out to be instrumental to the intrinsic value of
aesthetics •27
And the vast grandeur of metaphysics, when its truth has
pauses, and nature is seen to be "material, but not materialis-
22 COUS, 184.
23 SB, 18.
24 Ibid., 23.
25 Ibid., 25.
26 Ibid., 27.
27 Ibid., 28.
ff
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ceased to be of practical Importance, lies before us like a
landscape* 28 The necessity of action has paled before the
imaginative beauties of contemplation. But because morality
and the attainment of the good are means to the liberation
of man's sense of beauty, it does not follow that beauty is
dependent on the overcoming of evil. Morality is "the price of
human non- adaptation, and the consequence of the original sin
of unfitness • "29 The positive pleasure of beauty, however,
indicates that man is not entirely out of sympathy with his
surroundings, for it is when in all their peculiar uniqueness
he appreciates them without ulterior intent that man's
surroundings acquire intrinsic value.
Unless there were evil there would be no morality, but as
long as there are life and leisure there will be aesthetics, 30
for this is based on the "constitutional sensitiveness"3l of
man, who must be soberly utilitarian in the sphere of morals. 32
Yet even when aesthetics has been differentiated from intellec-
tual and moral functions, it must still be separated within the
field of immediately perceived values. 33 Such are all pleasures,
but the enjoyment of beauty locates the value in some external
object, while sensual pleasures are self-regarding. The sense
of beauty is, of course, highly sensual, but the extension of
its range prevents the focus of attention becoming the
28 Ibid., 29.
29 ibid., 50.
30 Loc. cit.
31 Ibid., 31.
32 Ibid., 35.
33 Loc. cit.
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experiencing self. 34 The aesthetic differentia is expressly
objectification. 35 Natural appetites are called selfish when
they are expressed by one person, but their reference to him
contains no more of "himself" than the most diffuse desires
of altruistic spirits contain of their "selves." "The content
of selfishness is a mass of unselfishness."36
While then the substance of aesthetics is far from any
selfishness, the qualities of beauty depend directly upon the
appreciation of specific selves. "It is unmeaning to say that
what is beautiful to one man 'ought' to be beautiful to
another."37 The criterion of the beauty of a work of art is
"the degree and kind of satisfaction It can give to him who
appreciates it most." 3^ And his appreciation depends on train-
ing and environment instead of on a universal aesthetic
principle. As many types of beauty are possible as man is
capable of seeing. They are not incompatible nor contradictory
but simply expressive of man's differing visibilities.
And the contemporary tendency to conceive a thing as a
"class of classes" and to derive a cohesive and coherent world
from a medley of sensations Santayana extends to the psychology
of aesthetics. Our primary impulse is to treat each and every
sensation as an objectified experience, as arising from the
properties inherent in some object. Only later as rational
54 Ibid
35 Ibid
36 ibid
• »
36.
44.
39.
37 Ibid., 41.
38 Loc. cit.
i
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beings do we substract from the world of colors and sounds all
but its tlmeful extension in space. Such simplification is
thought legitimate by the active intellect, aiming to under-
stand. The aesthetic activity, however, whose function is
enjoyment, has not depleted its domain of the first tendency
to regard the effects of the world on us as qualities inherent
We have now reached our definition of beauty, which,
in the terms of our successive analysis and narrowing of
the conception, is value positive, intrinsic, and
objectified. Or, in less technical language, Beauty is
pleasure regarded as the quality of a thing. 40
According to this definition the unseen and the unheard cannot
be beautiful. Moreover, the ugly, since it is the absence of
good, is excluded from aesthetics, and pleasure, which can be
predicated of some part of nature, is alone included.
The functions of man are of prime importance. Those vital
functions which preserve individual health are directly
proportional to the keenness of his perceptions.^ His sexual
function, on the other hand, makes man susceptible to beauty
because it makes him less isolated and less independent . 42
"What is important in emotional life is not which sex an animal
has, but that it has sex at all,"43 for in addition to imparting
human sympathy, the sexual function colors all of nature. "For
man all nature is a secondary object of sexual passion. "44
in it. 39
39 Ibid
40 ibid
41 Ibid
48.
49.
56.
42 Ibid., 57.
43 Loc. cit.
44 ibid., 62.
—
-
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And the reproductive function, by giving rise to social
institutions, instigates also social instincts. These are among
the most conscious interests of man. It is because the artist's
vital and sensual functions have too much usurped his interest
that he is so often unhappy.
The pursuit of happiness, then, does not at all parallel
the search for beauty. Happiness is the product of one's social
position; 45 beauty, of one's senses and imagination. 46 in fact,
it "always begins with the senses."47 The fundamental element
of taste is sensuous beauty. "The Parthenon not in marble, the
king's crown not of gold, and the stars not of fire, would be
feeble and prosaic things. "48
The beauty of material is thus the groundwork of all
higher beauty, both in the object, whose form and meaning
have to be lodged in something sensible, and in the mind,
where sensuous ideas, being the first to emerge, are the
first that can arouse delight. 49
Nevertheless, the beauty of form, if not as primary as that of
matter, is equally ultimate. If form were expressive of some-
thing other than itself, we could not speak of its beauty, for
beauty, we have seen, is never instrumental .50 Thus form has
a "specific value" or "emotional tinge"51 as well as material.
And metaphysically if not aesthetically form is prior to
content. We recognize objects as forms in a continuum. "The
outlines of most things are symmetrical because we choose what
45 Ibid., 64.
46 ibid., 65.
47 ibid., 79.
48 Ibid., 78.
49 ibid
50 ibid
51 Ibid • »
•
»
81.
83.
85.
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symmetrical lines we find to be the boundaries of objects. "52
Formal beauty is, moreover, the mark of the aesthetic mind. The
Platonic forms, however, are a manifestation of unity in
variety and not its explanation. 53
According to the definition of beauty, all forms are
beautiful. But they are not equally beautiful. For since they
are dependent on the nature of man, their value will change
according as his appreciation of it varies. Santayana's
hierarchy of forms is essentially subjective, 54 while his
beauty is objective, theories directly inverse to the Platonic
doctrine. Santayana would have us find formal beauty in the
formless. Nature is chaotic until man perceives it as a
landscape .55
Apperceptive forms underlie all structure - artistic or
scientific.
A theory is a form of apperception, and in applying it to
the facts, although our first concern is naturally the
adequacy of our instrument of comprehension, we are also
influenced, more than we think, by the ease and pleasure
with which we think in its terms, that is, by its beauty. 56
Perfection is the definite finitude of form. "There are as many
kinds of perfection as there are types or forms of apperception
latent in the mind. "57
The sign of progress is discrimination. 58 Nature itself is
an organisation of forms, and thus beauty is "the ground of
52 Ibid., 93. 56 Ibid., 139.
53 ibid., 117. 57 Ibid., 147.
54 Ibid., 130. 58 Ibid., 152.
55 Ibid., 133.
1
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practical fitness. "59 The human eye, however, does not always
In seeing achieve distinction and delight. Perception does not
of necessity comprehend nor idealize. Observation leaves room
"for hypothesis and for art."60 "As hypothsis organises
I
experiences imaginatively in ways in which observation has not
been able to do, so art organises objects in ways to which
nature, perhaps, has never condescended. "61
For, after all, it must be remembered that beauty, or
pleasure to be given to the eye, is not a guiding principle
in the world of nature or in that of the practical arts.
The beauty is in nature a result of the functional
adaptation of our senses and imagination to the mechanical
products of our environment. This adaptation is never
complete, and there is, accordingly, room for the fine
arts, in which beauty is a result of the intentional
adaptation of mechanical forms to the functions which our
senses and imagination already have acquired. This
watchful subservience to our aesthetic demands is the
essence of fine art. Nature is the basis, but man is
the goal.62
Ideals are "absolute expressions of the passions," but the arts
"compound passion with experience. "63 No one essence comes into
existence more fittingly than any other. Just as in the unhewn
block from which Michel-angelo cut a statue, the ideals which
are to be realized in the arts depend "on the genial fertility
of things already existing - the artist, his habits, his
surroundings.
"
64 Artists are those performers "singled out from
The crowd, "65 whose suasion leads them to "train themselves to
please ."66 Yet "the forms they create, they create spontaneous-
59 Ibid.,
60 ibid.,
159.
161.
63 EGP, 103.
64 re, 79.
65 ra, 49.
66 Loc* cit..165.

ly#
"
67 and even these forms contain but "a haunting essence,
without power to reproduce itself or to exclude any particular
sequel. 1168
Thus essences are objectified for a moment in art and
imaginative life. The ideal, of course, ncan never itself
exist, nor can its particular embodiments endure ."69 Since
essences are essentially good, when embodied as values in the
arts, these are seen to be naturally pleasing. All aesthetic
values are therefore beautiful. Some may express the evil and
the ugly, but "tragedy and comedy please in spite of this
expressiveness and not by virtue of it; and except for the
pleasures they give, they have no place among the fine arts, "70
which should contain "nothing but the good of life."7*
Santayana ! s theory of expression accounts for the various
forms of beauty by making them the qualities "acquired by
objects through association."72 Thus the beauty of material
form in art becomes expressive when a mind "associates" such
beauty with an allied "circle of thoughts."73
Although association functions in no specific organ, it is
a fundamental process in man's consciousness
.
7^ Pleasure
emerges as spontaneously from the perception of relation as
from the perception of material and form. "The pleasure of
67 re, 79.
68 Ibid., 80.
69 RS, 30.
7° SB, 258-259.
71 Ibid., 260.
72 Ibid., 193.
73 Ibid., 196.
74 Ibid., 199.
li
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association is an immediate feeling. 1,75
75 Ibid., 201.

CHAPTER III
BEAUTY IN ART
"There Is no essential difference"! between sensation and
thought. Our Ideas of things are "political caricatures made In
the human interest," 2 and "all theory is a subjective form
given to an indeterminate material. "3 Logic, however, adapts
one's self to one's environment while ethics Inaugurates the
reverse process. Aesthetics combines both processes and deals
with moments of vital equilibrium between man and nature* In
man's artistic construction "well-bred instinct meets reason
half-way, and is prepared for the consonance that may follow."4
If art were merely a reasonable construct, it could not be
free and plastic. To be free means for Santayana to be capable
of flux, 5 and reason deals with immutable figments. Yet because
"at the center of every natural being there is something
individual and Incommensurable, a seed with its native impulses
and aspirations, "6 there is a basic freedom in art which accounta
for the various media and forms of expression. Instinct and
intelligence combine in the Life of Reason, which "In the
widest sense of the word might be called Art." 7
1 SAF, 102.
2 Ibid., 104.
3 RA, 128.
4 RS, 27.
5 COUS, 211.
6 Ibid., 166,
7 RCS, 6.
I
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A process is merely mechanical until consciousness inter-
prets it in terms of value. Separated from the human bias
mechanism contains neither progress nor culmination* "In
removing consciousness, we have removed the possibility of
worth."8 The will of man effects the being of ethics and
aesthetics. Metaphysical truth depends on the intellect of
man. Gould he exist an emotionless monad, the perfect reflection
of nature, beauty would be inconceivable to him. For his
consciousness would then be an apparatus for observing instead
of a power for appreciating.
We might, in a word, have a world of idea without a
world of will. In this case, as completely as if
consciousness were absent altogether, all value and
excellence would be gone. So that for the existence of
good in any form it is not merely consciousness but
emotional consciousness that is needed.^
Thus Sant ayana's will, contrary to that of Schopenhauer, is in
abeyance until the aesthetic faculty is called into operation.
Then it is of primary importance. The aesthetic impulse is no
vacuous pause but the vital force which furnishes the data for
all of man's activities.
The self is a logical figment derived from the compounded
objectified interests which give it content. 10 That is, such is
the metaphysical self of Santayana, the self justified by reason
which must disintegrate before it can understand. Aesthetically
8
9
10
SB, 17.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
18.
40.
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Santayana's self has to be an active willing subject. "Our will,
as Descartes said in a different context, is infinite, while
our intelligence is finite."11
A dualism if fact runs through all of Santayana's thought.
In the progression of events there is a continual egression of
ideals. The realm of poetry is ideal, but when its ideals
intervene in experience, poetry becomes religion. !2 Religion,
nevertheless, remains relevant to poetic values and human
purposes and must always be in this sense allegorical. Such
allegory, however, is the basis of creation, 1^ for the value
of reality is measured by "its relation to the ideal."!4
Common sense and science themselves "live in a world of
expurgated mythology, "15 and understanding is but an
"applicable fiction."16 Understanding is as spontaneous as
imagination and can be discriminated only by being practiced.
It is "an imagination prophetic of experience,"1^ and the
imagination is "the universal self."18
Santayana recognizez an ideal element in all men which
deals with the realm of essences. The imaginative faculty
escapes the facts of perception and conforms to man's sense
of value. Thus it is as relative to humanity as science, but
to disavow truth and art on the grounds of relativity is to
fall into the logical absurdity of mysticism which "consists in
11 Ibid., 183.
12 IPR, v .
13 Ibid., ix.
14 Loc. cit.
15 Ibid., 5.
16 Loc. cit.
!7 Ibid., 7.
18 Ibid., 9^
1* !
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the surrender of a category of thought on account of the
discovery of its relativity. "!9
The classic spirit and that to which Santayana clings is
founded on finitude. Yet Santayana admits that if based on
rational postulates, mysticism lends depth to philosophy. "The
art of mysticism is to be mystical in spots. n 20 Although in no
sense superhuman or abnormal, mysticism exaggerates one
rational concept to the exclusion of all others. Santayana sees
the mystic "as miserable a man"2^ as the mathematician and with
the similar aesthetic attitude of cosmic interest. Yet the
progress of mysticism annihilates itself. True expansion and
perfection are the function of imagination. Too often, however,
interpretation mellows into fable, and men cease to accept as
valuable what they no longer appreciate.
Aristotle's aim was the ideal of all nature and not of man
Growth is for the sake of the fruition of life, and the
fruition of life consists in the pursuit and attainment
of objects. The moral virtues belong to the pursuit, the
intellectual to the attainment. Knowledge is the end of
all endeavor, the justification and fulfilment of all
growth. 22
The Aristotelian god is the ideal of all reality and "the most
philosophical that has yet been constructed.
"
23 Aristotle's
error was to attempt the proof of the existence of god, for
ideals give meaning to matter without becoming material.
alone.
19 Ibid
20 Ibid
21 Ibid
14.
16.
19.
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
• 9 71.
72.
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Existence is irrelevant to god, which is the "final cause of
nature and man."2^ Pinal causes are values rather than
existent s. They combine positive fact with aspiration in one
image. Yet while essences are stable, final causes eventually
disintegrate into their elements, "some objectified into a
physical universe of mechanism and law, others built into a
system of rational objects. "25
For "what is false in the science of facts may be true in
the science of values. "26 Existence refers to the mechanism of
causal relationships, but function relates to the interest
involved in results. "Compared with the ideal, every human
perfection becomes a shadow and a deceit ."27 The ideal retains
an impersonal character .28 Platonism consists in the pursuit of
permanence behind the relative appearance of phenomena.
At the other extreme lie the "barbarisms" of Whitman and
Browning, for whom the passing emotion is a final element.
Aristotle links Platonic impersonalism with Brownian expression,
and Santayana develops this theory of "the unfolding of a
definite nature, the gradual manifestation of a known idea. "29
For ideals are "possible forms of being. "3°
And works of art are these potentialities made actual. The
idea itself does not instigate artistic creation. The image and
the idea embodied in art are the result of past experience and
24 ibid
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
27 Ibid
• »
73.
75.
91.
126.
28 Ibid.,
29 Ibid.,
30 LE, 5.
129.
204.
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the simultaneous effect of future apprehension. What man says
he produces is that which satisfies him. Art, then, rests on
the human being's technique and on matter's adaptability. "When
men find that by chance they have started a useful change in the
world, they congratulate themselves upon it and call their
persistence in that practice a free activity. "31 Thus, in art
there is the same play of values as in the realm of essence, but
in art these values are materialized and made permanent*
Matter's only value consists in the assumption of artistic
forms. Art is, of course, dependent for its existence on the
material world, but spirit is no more the slave of mechanism
than freedom is of duty. First causes are of little "worth. "32
The worthwhile part of action is that it envisages an ideal
distinct from the facts it perceives. Otherwise "all life
would have collapsed into a purposeless datum."33 Matter must
be susceptible of form and of the definite ideals man wills.
Chaos becomes a prerequisite to art, and disorder assumes the
character of a kind of form. "Evil is so far from being a
propitious formlessness in matter that it is rather an impeding
form which matter has already assumed. "34 This so-called
formlessness is overcome in two ways: first, by industrial and
then, by liberal art.
This molding of matter takes place in nature, "where
31 RA, 11.
32 ibid., 22-23.
33 Ibid., 29.
34 Ibid., 32,
i
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nutrition and reproduction fit the body for its ideal functions,
whereupon sensation and cerebration make it a direct organ of
mind. "35 Industry makes matter tractable; liberal art makes
matter expressive. Technique and genius are thus inseparable in
the fim arts. So also are utility and spontaneity. 36 in point
of history, however, spontaneity preceded usefulness. The
spirit of the barbarian embodies beauty automatically, and in
j
uncivilised souls the sense of beauty is most spontaneous • 37
•
Santayana insists that the spontaneous, because it is
irrevocably given, is a fundamental good. 38 All desires are in
1
themselves good. Evil insinuates itself only in the synthesis
and conflict between desires. All the moods of nature are
innocent; "it is only on meeting that they blush. "39 The sin of
materialism is due to no inherent quality of matter but to the
incapacity of matter to embody all essences and ideas. Only
teleologically can there be sin, and then the conflict is not
in nature but in man's mistaken notion of what nature should be.
The moral view of aesthetics, however, pays art a great
tribute, for it endows art with purpose and regards it as
comprehensive of life. 40 Thus, "the criticism of art is a part
of morals ."41 All interests in life are inter-woven, and ideals
are formed from many disparate tendencies, so that aesthetic
values need more justification than the mere affirmation of
35 Loc. cit. 39 Ibid., 168-169.
36 Ibid., 37. 40 Ibid., 177.
37 Ibid., 38. 41 Ibid., 178.
38 Ibid., 166-167.
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their essential goodness. They must be justified as one element
among many and their influence on other values must be shown to
be efficacious.
As Santayana has said above, "the order of values inverts
that of causes*
"
4^ Experience is more valuable per se than the
organic functions which generate it or the essences which per-
vade it. Although "thought is a controlled and consistent
madness,"43 the evaluation of thought's excellence remains one
of the functions of society. 44 The great moments of human life
are the subject matter of the "noblest" art. 43 And since human
life has its source in natural causes and mechanism, this is
the "source of beauty."46
Beauty is a free natural gift. When it has appeared, we
may perceive that its influence is rational, since it
both expresses and fosters a harmony of impressions and
impulses in the soul; but to take any mechanism whatever,
and merely because it is actual or necessary to insist
that it is worth exhibiting, and that by divine decree it
shall be pronounced beautiful, is to be quite at sea in
moral philosophy. 4?
But the constitution of beauty is teleological. Art is 4n fact
the form teleology takes in society. 48
Now that aesthetic value has arisen, its cause is seen to be
ridiculously small in comparison with its magnificent effect.
Matter and mechanism dwindle in the light of what they bring
into existence, for "what is primary in the order of genesis
is always last and most dependent in the order of worth.
"
4^ Yet
42 Ibid., 45.
43 BHMO, 250.
44 RA, 51.
45 Ibid
46 Ibid
47 Ibid
• »
• » 122.
124.
130.
48 RM, 119.
49 RA, 22-23.
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just as morality often serves beauty when the latter has to be
reached by effort, so industrial art is the instrument of
approach to the fine arts. Industry perfects what is too gross
to be directly susceptible of artistic perfection. Art being
the embodiment of ideals, industrial art is the active
overcoming and molding of matter while liberal art gives to
this content expression and meaning. Such a separation reflects
Santayana's whole philosophy. Matter and essence, like the
psyche and spirit, are mirrored in the aesthetic as content,
which combines material and form, and expression.
Industrial art makes of pure matter a content susceptible
to expression. Like all matter, the materials of art maintain
an independent existence, but industry gives them their first
being. It is man's first experience in the realm of matter
Just as fine art introduces him to the realm of essence. That
essences should be realized in art as ideals requires a certain
discrepancy between what is and what could be. Infinite
potentialities underlie the chaos in Santayana. The "initial
formlessness in matter is essential to art's existence. "50 That
matter should be absolutely unformed favors art; the evil is
that it should assume a form unpropitious to some ideal. 51
Industry is the overcoming of such an evil, the removal of
impediments to art. The function of industrial art is negative.
50 Ibid., 30.
51 Ibid., 32«

It renders apt the meaningless, but like all instrumental
values it partakes of intrinsic worth and shares in the ideal
character of fine art. Technical skill is thus not entirely
the slave's prerogative. Technique is also the prerogative of
the man of genius
«
52
While the work of art is in reality spontaneous and
unforseen, the idea of the result of one's industry may be
called the purpose of the artist. A consciousness of aim
pervades creation. This natural delusion is based on the
frequency of man's satisfactions, the tendency of events to
please and of works of art to be beautiful. Art is neither
pure spontaneity nor utter determinism. It is the determining
of the spontaneous. In the Life of Reason technique would
justify itself and all spontaneous action would be relevant. 53
Arts "become nobler and more rational as their utility is
rendered spontaneous or their spontaneity beneficent."54 The
automatic impulse of liberal art tends to lead fancy astray in
the field of essences instead of co-ordinating instinct with
existence. "Arts are instincts bred and reared in the open,
creative habits acquired in the light of reason."55
Although to Santayana the spontaneous arts precede the
useful, 56 great artistic creation is modified by contact with
the world •57 Since the first arts were not deliberately
52 Ibid., 37.
53 Loc. cit.
54 Loc. cit.
55 Ibid., 5.
56 Ibid., 37.
57 Ibid., 39.

developed nor rationally justified, there has grown up a
variety of fanciful beauties, enjoyable in themselves but seg-
regated from actual life. Ceremonies, rituals, and religions
pertain to this sphere. Religions are kinds of science whose
application to the world it would be futile to attempt. Sciences
can be appraised on the merits of their validity, but all
religions are equally valid. They belong to the realm of
essence. Thus Santayana reconciles his innate attachment to
scholastic Catholicism with his realistic prejudice. The Virgin
mother is an essence like the round square to be enjoyed in
intuition. Its relevance to matters of fact is beside the
point, and "it is a pity that a foolish iconoclasm should so
long have deprived the Protestant mind of the contemplation of
this ideal. "58
Yet such an ideal is not a true work of art. It is a mean-
ing which can find no suitable medium for expression, a wander-
ing essence too complex for the habits of matter. Art conforms
to the existence from which it arises. Dancing, for example,
however symbolic it may become, retains always its first
character of gesture. 59 Indeed this primary quality gives the
dance its meaning, for gesture like speech indicates intent*
Therefore the dance is a consciously rational expression and
so can appeal to intuition. Its power is immense. "The massive
58 SB, 190.
59 RA, 41.
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suggestion, the pressure of the ambient will, Is out of all
proportion to the present (sail for action."60
As in the dance so in music the primary purpose is not
aesthetic satisfaction hut self-satisfaction. 61 At first vocal
expression asserts Itself with no ulterior motive. But its
character of automatic response Is subdued by time Into an
habitual custom. The reflection of memory ensues in conscious
training and conditioning of expression. Like the spirit of man
based on his psyche, the experience of music depends on man's
physical capacity to distinguish and relate sounds. But if
this were all, music would be a sort of mathematics. The
peculiar quality of musical harmonies, however, Is not their
harmonious patterns, in which all art shares, but their
duration in time, "a medium which appeals more than space to
emotion. "62 Music is a part of life for we live through it. "It
is not so much the music that moves as we that move with it ."63
Yet besides its flux and movement, every tone has its proper
essence and Intrinsic worth. Some tones will be too extreme for
the ear of man just as the delicacy of some chords will escape
him and the nuance of a complex phrase exceed his sensibilities.
Such unheard beauty is valueless to man. And so a symphony
should not ignore the analytic and synoptic powers of its
audience. 64 Santayana vigorously asserts the relativity of
60 Ibid., 42.
61 Loc. cit.
62 Ibid., 46.
63 Ibid., 47.
64 Ibid., 51.
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values, "Everything has its own value and sets up its price;
but others must judge if that price is fair, and sociability is
the condition of all rational excellence."65 But although some
types of music will appeal to different persons and so be of
differing worth to them, every musical structure is beautiful
just as every mathemetical proposition is true. "Pure music is
pure art ."66
Nevertheless, music is not an abstraction from life. It
"can produce emotion as directly as can fighting or love."67
Music acts immediately on the psyche which "touches the soul"68
as its physical condition at every moment affects the spirit.
And music is far more potent than mere experience. The musician
can combine chords unknown to nature and fabricate melodies too
intricate for the shifting winds. Life blurs the delicate
discriminations of music which gives "form to what is naturally
Inarticulate .
"
69 Unlike the other arts music can express one
essence completely. It can develop a theme. And this theme can
be entirely apart from existence, for as an essence it will be
good In Itself and in need of no justification. Thus music
fulfils man's desire to express incongrous feelings and
Impulses.
Originally speech too resembled music in its disdain of
matters of fact. 70 The ideal existence of language preceded
?
5 Loc. cit. 68 Loc. cit.
°6 Ibid., 53. 6 * Ibid., 55.
67 Ibid., 54. 70 Ibid., 70.
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according to Santayana its realistic employment, for speech
"must be a part of nature living its own life before it can
become a symbol for the rest and bend to external control. "71
Music and language have their being in a medium removed from
existential space, but an attachment growing up between words
and events, the first caime to symbolize the latter.
The net of vocal relations caught ^thej natural object as a
cobweb might catch a fly, without destroying or changing
it. The object's quality passed to the word at the same
time that the word's relations enveloped the object; and
thus a new weight and significancewas added to sound,
previously nothing but a dull music. 72
But events change as words do not, and the permanence of
things is more in the words identifying them than in the ever-
changing substanoaBs of the things themselves. The idea of
sameness persisting through change is due to the imposition of
ideals on matters of fact. 73 Understanding arises when "the
actual flux is ideally suspended and an ideal harness is loosely
flung upon things. "74 Words allow this fixation and interpreta-
tion; they resemble coins, particular and yet universal in their
function. Thus, psychologically a word is a unique experience,
but logically a word may have many contexts, and so "nominalism
[is] right in psychology and realism in logic." 75
Literature partakes of each field, for it combines the
music and the meaning of words. Like music Santayana thinks it
arose spontaneously, but unlike music it attempts to represent
71 Loc. cit*
72 Loc. cit.
75 Ibid., 72.
74 Loc. cit.
75 ibid., 74.
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as well as to express. These two tendencies in literature are
continually in conflict. The function of words pulls them into
a strictly symbolic relation with existence while their origin
impels a poetic exuberance and unbusinesslike fancy. This is
merely to repeat that their function is logical and their origin
psychological. The function of music does not transcend its
origin while the function of mathematics entirely ignores its
origin, but literature follows a mean path. Its symbolism
retains a musical quality for all its significance.
Irresponsible and trivial in its abstract impulse, man's
simian chatter becomes noble as it becomes symbolic; its
representative function lends it a serious beauty, its
utility endows it with moral worth. 76
There could be a pure language which like pure music would
refrain from reliance to facts and would play forever on its
own themes, but this would be only "pure experiment; and it is
not strange that nine-tenths of it should be pure failure." 717
Santayana agrees with Plato that the inspiration of poets is
mad and when this madness can find no suitable place in the
public scheme of things Santayana too would demand that society
expel what is harmful to its welfare. When novel, all words and
expressions are poetic; prose is the end of poetry's evolution
from inspiration to signification.78
Thus poetry appeals to emotion; prose, to analysis. In this
decadence of language, as Santayana thinks the transition from
76 ibid., 84,
77 Ibid., 91.
78 Ibid., 98»
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poetry to prose to represent, the intrinsic has preceded the
instrumental good. Prose, however, retains an intrinsic quality
in its form, for prose is only prosaic as far as its content is
concerned. Prose is applicable poefery. Were the form of prose
to become prosaic, language would be as unconscious as breathing
for of the utterly instrumental one is unaware. In a purely
rational world the form of language would be poetical while
its material was prosaic.
In one sense, nevertheless, even the material of prose
remains poetic, for in our conception of the world a bias is
necessary to every point of view, and the first foundation of
a bias is poetical. Prose is the elaboration of such a bias into
a symbolic representation of itself. This theory maintains
Santayana's fundamental tendency to base reason on instinct.
Even more than the feeling of success which prose imparts to
dealings with the world does plastic construction give man
a feeling of power and of influence over nature. 79 The two
elements of construction are structure and ornament. Both have
their own beauty and in a work of art their characteristics
should blend. Construction is the basis for decoration and
this is in turn the basis for representation, which contains
the intellectual element in art. 80
That is to say, representation is an intellectual process
79 Ibid., 116.
80 ibid., 142.
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because all sensation and all Ideas represent their objects,
and artistic imitation is a prolongation of this phenomenon.
Thus Santayana opposes the doctrine of art for art's sake. If
art is to be representative, its subject is obviously of impor-
tance although, of course, the medium in which the subject
will be portrayed may digfer. Some subjects will be more
adequate than others to certain media. 8!
Santayana believes sculpture to portray most completely
the hero. Drama makes him transitory and at the same time
destroys the morality of the actor who in acting loses his own
personality. Sculpture, however, makes "firm and harmonious "82
the imagined. But believing it to be obsolete, Santayana turns
to painting, the portrayal of circumstances and incidents
rather than of persons.
Painting is not a construct but an impression. It can only
be looked at "in one light"85 and arises when the beauty of an
image causes it to linger in the mind. 84
81 Ibid., 152.
82 Ibid., 154.
83 ibid., 157,
84 Ibid., 163.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
Although reflection is a part of life, it is the last part.l
Platonic intuitions are disloyal to the comprehension of
substance in being the highest expression of it. 2 Yet all
comprehension and knowledge is in a sense disloyal, for even
in scientific theory, the adequacy of understanding depends on
simplicity, that is to say, on its beauty. 3 While arts are
"instincts bred and reared in the open, sciences achieve no
more than symbolic representations of these instincts .5 And
just as religions represent planes of living, 6 so truths
represent planes of comprehending or of awareness of living.
Logic describes aesthetics, which needs no justification
itself, for the beautiful, like the world and like ourselves,
is "an experience; there is nothing more to say about it.
Indeed, if we look at things teleologically, • . . beauty is of
all things what least calls for explanation."7 Prom the
teleological point of view, beauty is a rational poatulate
similar to space and time and like them an element in the
given. This final, ultimate, and unaccountable datum, however,
1 SB, 11. 5 Ibid., 84.
; Ibid., 8. 6 RR> 14#3 Ibid., 139. 7 SB, 268.
4 O A CRA, 5.
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differs according as we regard it mechanistically or teleologi-
cally.
Nature for Santayana is mechanistic; man, teleological.8
The truth of metaphysics applies to natural phenomena. 9 Ethics
and aesthetics, which deal respectively with negative and
positive data, occur in the purpose, progress, and culmination
of the teleological self
•
10 The psyche of metaphysics is a
compound of objectified interests, 11 while the spirit of
aesthetics is an actively willing individual.! 2 The one is
inert; the other, motivating. 13 Yet Santayana fails to
completely objectify the psyche for he makes it sensible of
"shock. w14 His metaphysic thus tends to pantheism just as his
aesthetic approaches idealism. Only be repeated assertions of
their interdependence does he maintain the naturalistic bias.15
The infinite potentialities of man are bounded by the
circumstances of his experience. We are so constrained to life
that other men are rather parts of our events than distinct
selves
.
The serious and equable development of a plot has a more
stable worth £than that of a character} in its greater
similarity to life, which allows us to see other men's
minds through the medium of events, and not events
through the medium of other men's minds. 3-6
Yet since these events are ours, objectivity becomes the
8 RCS, 172. 13 RR, 15.
9 SB, 184. 14 SAP, 145,
10 RCS, 1. 15 RS, 137.
11 PSL, 66. 16 SB, 176.
12 RM, 139.
(
predication of those of our sensations which are coherent with
"reality. w And thus "the real world is merely the shadow of
that assurance of eventual experience which accompanies sanity."
Preference is Irrational, and the good is what we desire.
Santayana's aesthetic manifests the good, and his
metaphysic describes it. The world is valuable before it is
understandable. Santayana presupposes no theory of correspon-
dence between symbolic propositions and nature. 17 Nature is
merely the interchange of potential and actual forces without
significance. 18 The interpretation of Santayana aims at
development^ and at the emergence of beauty from a purposeless
flux, 20 and he is rightly a poet rather than a philosopher.
Had he elaborated a metaphysic from such a fundamental aesthetic
impulse as that of Groce, he would still have aimed at truth.
But Santayana both begins and ends with beauty, and truth is
sandwiched between where its savour is lost.
Santayana would have nature the basis of man's goal, but
instead nature becomes one of man's goals. The function of
imagination adapts itself to a mechanical environment. In fine
art, however, man has adapted nature to his acquired functions.2*
It is not strange, then, to find in Santayana a harmony between
nature and experience, when nature is the imaginable and when
20 RCS, 193.
21 SB, 165, footnote.
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reason is satisfied by the sense of beauty.
When our senses and imagination find what they crave,
when the world so shapes itself or so mouls the mind
that the correspondence between them is perfect, then
perception is pleasure, and existence needs no apology.22
Existence being essentially substantial and art the essence of
substance, beauty becomes substance ! s prerogative. Indeed,
three categories seem to delineate themselves in Santayana.
Logic concerns the truth of essences; morals, the goodness
of matter; and art, the beauty of substance. Morals and art are
perhaps preferable to the more graceful terms, ethics and
aesthetics, for these, as we ordinarily consider them, deal
with essences and approach the realm of truth. Discourse itself i
deals with essences, 23 and Santayana believes ethics and
aesthetics to be matters of events or situations, 24 S o that he
denies himself the metaphysical right of discussing the sense
of beauty. But perhaps a eulogy was all he intended.
Although a non-believer, he remains a Platonist and, like
those catholic scholastics whom he resembles, seeks the
verification of the Philosophicus. But apprecistive enjoyment
as well as thoughtful understanding lies in the realm of
substance and need not attempt Icarean flights. Santayana'
s
certainty that beauty and truth are the ultimate goods
hypostatises these concepts and manifests their essences instead
of explaining them.
22 Ibid., 269,
23 RE, 4.
24 ra, 28
.
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Although the world is susceptible of intelligibility and
beauty, Santayana holds that to suspect it of falsity or
ugliness is to hypostatise non-entities. These non-existents,
however, are as eternally essences as any others. And the very
event which makes one proposition forever true makes the
contradictory statement forever false. The system of Santayana
contains the same eudaemonistic teleology as did Aristotle ' s, 25
but in addition to the negativity of evil, error itself is a
biological accident .26 Santayana is fundamentally optimistic,
because only man's momentary inadequacy leads to beauty by way
of the avoidance of evils.
The will of man is so harmonious that its unification lies
at the basis of the unity man sees in nature*27 And the
experience which he cannot systematize as spatial, man still
unifies as mental. "The 'secondary qualities' are relegated to
a personal inconsequential region; they constitute the realm
of appearance, the realm of mind. rt28 This realm is inconsequen-
tial because of its independence and far more important than
sensuous reality which "perishes as it goes."29
The existence of other men, however, necessitates the use
of man's two capacities of perception and imagination. Other
beings are inferred neither by analogy nor by a sort of
mystical intuition30 as is frequently asserted. The abstraction
25 SB, 156-157.
26 COUS, 101.
27 RCS, 123.
28 Ibid., 126.
29 Ibid., 132.
30 ibid., 139-140,
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of objects and. subjects occurs only after long reflection upon
the world of chaos. Originally experience combines all its
qualities. 31 We believe in other selves because "before they
are conceived to be merely material, £theyj are conceived to
possess all the qualities which our own consciousness possesses
when we behold them. "32 We and nature, then, are so inter-
related that even the abstraction of ourselves from the world
is the signal of sophistication. Science itself omits the
initial mythology of man's life.
Pragmatically, other selves exist by analogy. Pragmatism,
however, tests the truth rather than reveals it, and the
revelation by which men recognize their fellows is a case of
the pathetic fallacy. 33 Yet on this occasion such a fallacy is
valid, for the tertiary qualities of similar objects do
correspond, says Santayana.
Nevertheless, in spite of the human being's emotional
aspect, a reasonable harmony pervades his aims. The fleeting
impression is the substance of reality, and desire the occasion
of man's ideals. 34
An ideal representing no living interest would be
irrelevant to perception which should not be composed
of the materials that sense supplies, or should not
re-embody actual sensations in an intelligible system. 35
Thus all ideals are reconcilable in the Life of Reason, which
31 Ibid. 142. 34 Ibid
35 Ibid
257.
259-260.
33 Ibid.,
• »
159.
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"constitute a single formal interest, the interest in harmony."
Art rests on experience, and "a happy result can be secured in
art, as in life, only by intelligence • "37 Intelligence is the
equilibrium between impulse and environment. We are practical
failures when we disregard the original impulse of our wills;
we are aesthetic failures when we ignore the conditions of
reality. "Art is simply an adequate industry"38 and "the best
instrument of happiness • "39 "The emergence of arts out of
instincts is the token and exact measure of nature's success
and of mortal happiness." 40 The aesthetic element is integrated
in the totality of man's experience, but thought and action
are beautiful in the defining pauses of their harmony. The
severest utility adapts itself to beauty.
Non-existent, immutable, and separate essences distinguish
themselves from the conjunction of actual, irrelevant, and
interacting events, and as our view changes we see the beauty,
tragedy, and comedy of life. As we are aesthetic, moral, or
practical beings, nature is correspondingly "lyrical in its
ideal essence, tragic in its fate, and comic in its existencil"
Santayana's aesthetic, like a Leibnizian monad, reflects
on its own scale the pattern of the whole system. Everything
intermingles and overlaps in existence and in essence is
rigidly separate. So art is a unity which on analysis falls
36 Ibid., 267. 59 Ibid., 229.
37 RA, 222. 40 Ibid., 230.
38 Ibid., 223. 41 SE, 142.
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into three distinct categories - form, material, and expression.
Santayana believes that these are legitimate distinctions, and
moreover each element is self-sustaining. Their co-existence
in art resembles that of essence, matter, and substance in
metaphysics and that of beauty* morality, and knowledge in
experience. So also the analysis of works of art into content
(material and form) and value (expression) reflects Santayana'
s
first distinction of man as psyche and spirit.
Although Santayana is admittedly unconcerned with the
coherence of his thought, he achieves a singularly forceful
unity which it has been the purpose of this paper to demonstrate!
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The Introduction states the aim, scope, and content of the
thesis and defines the most important of Santayana 's terms.
Santayana himself formulates no system, but his ideas will be
co-ordinated as their significance would seem to warrant.
The second chapter shows the influence of such a temperament
as that of Santayana in constructing a wLife of Reason" based on
emotion. Following the scholastic tradition the human being is
composed of two elements - animal faith and intuition, psyche
and spirit. The finite exists; the infinite is. Yet there is a
continual ingression of the one into the other, effecting
knowledge and art.
The intuition of the spirit is necessary to knowledge, while
the animal faith of the psyche prevents too complete absorption
in the abstract. Animal faith allows for the beginnings of art,
and intuition accounts for the perception of forms. Intuition
leads to beauty; animal faith, to art. In experience the two
are fused, and it is difficult to say whether we are rational
because we can abstract terms from our knowledge or emotional
because knowledge deals with events and situations. The chart
in the Introduction illustrates the manner in which Santayana
first reconciles his dualism and then abstracts a further
division from the synthesis. The third column represents man's
experience. It is evident that Santayana looks at reality as of
a nature to reflect its dualism on every level of experience.
1
48
The category of things represents, of course, works of art.
They are materialized essences and presuppose a universe of
anterior divisions of reflection and action. Reflection is the
analytic power; action, the unifying. Reflection uncovers
essences while action burries them In existence. Santayana thus
reconciles pluralism and monism. Both are true because both
apply to experience, and lacking either experience would cease.
The experience of beauty is defined as "objectified
pleasure," Santayana in this way hypostatising a subjective
satisfaction of Instinct. The "murmur of nature, wayward and
narcotic" fuses with the "power to see things as they are"l
as Santayana arrives at the dualism of his aesthetic. This
theory of expression is in brief the association of form and
material, the Aristotelian principles of Association by
contiguity and by similarity. Expression necessitates intelli-
gence and feeling. Happiness is a social phenomenon, but beauty
is individual. The pleasure called beauty is the individual's
relating of fact and fancy or, what is the same thing, his
power of expression.
Chapter III describes the aesthetic activity, arising when
teleological events occur In the mechanistic system. Value
and Ideals or Aristotelian entelechies are considered. The
origin of art in morality is discussed. Art arises when man
controls his environment. Moral endeavor overcomes the industri-
al stage of nature and makes liberal art possible. The specific
1 COUS, 111
J . ,
1
1
•
•
\
49
arts are surveyed and their unique beauties considered.
The Conclusion estimates the relation of man's sense of
beauty to his other senses. Logic, ethics, and aesthetics are
considered. Poetry, tragedy, and comedy are seem to represent
the essences of aesthetics, morality, and existence.
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